The Economist and the "Exit Costs" of losing power

The Economist has an uncanny ability of distilling a country's complex politics into 500 words - and yesterday's article on the election is pretty sharp. It states:

"The Awami League, which has has been in power continuously for ten years, flagrantly wielded the full power of state institutions, from police to courts to the Election Commission, to promote its chances. Sheikh Hasina’s party also resorted to virtually every electoral trick in the bag." (For those who cannot access the website, the whole article is set out at the end of this post. )

Nonetheless there are a few things that the Economist omitted. Whilst it may well have been the case that some opposition polling agents did not "dare" to turn up to polling stations due to Awami League/police intimidation, what appears to have happened is that most did try to enter the polling stations but were refused entry or were forced out.

However, a more significant omission concerns the answer to the question that the Economist posed in its article (which BangladeshPoltico had earlier discussed) about "why should Sheikh Hasina pull out so many stops to ensure a victory that most observers had assumed was in the bag in any case?" 

Putting to one side the matter about whether it is true that most observers actually thought that Hasina would win in a free and fair election - in my experience, most independent observers didn't think this as they did not believe the polls! - the Economist failed to discuss one crucial answer to the question they pose. This is the perception of Awami League leaders to the "exit costs" they would face were they to lose. 

As the party has held onto power using increasingly severe repressive tactics (arbitrary detentions, extra judicial killings, disappearances etc), Awami League leaders increasingly perceive that they could face severe repercussions were they to lose power to this same opposition whom have been victims of their supression. This results in Awami League leaders taking more and more outrageous and overt steps to hold onto power. Hence the systemic rigging of the election.

It is this which partly - or even wholly -  explains why the Awami League have been so systematic in their election-fixing. Increasingly, the only thing that matters to the party leaders is holding onto power - as each one fears that losing could result in them facing serious retribution.

This is why it is difficult to see how a peaceful transfer of power can take place in the near future.

  

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Below is the Economist article in full:

AS RESULTS TRICKLED in following a turbulent day of voting, it grew increasingly clear that Sheikh Hasina Wajed was romping towards an unprecedented fourth five-year term as prime minister of Bangladesh. Along with a clutch of smaller allies, her Awami League party looked set to capture a garish 82% of the popular vote. A rival alliance dominated by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) appeared unlikely to muster more than a handful of the 300 parliamentary seats. But the embarrassingly skewed tally suggested that the BNP was not really the biggest loser. The biggest loss was for democracy itself.
Since winning independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh has held 11 national elections under radically different circumstances, ranging from absolute dictatorship to relatively open and free contests. The flawed general election of December 30th represented a sharp reversion to the less democratic end of the spectrum. This was not merely because election-day violence left at least 17 dead. The Awami League, which has has been in power continuously for ten years, flagrantly wielded the full power of state institutions, from police to courts to the Election Commission, to promote its chances. Sheikh Hasina’s party also resorted to virtually every electoral trick in the bag.
In the months leading to the vote, BNP leaders and followers found themselves relentlessly harassed by arrests and prosecutions. The party’s leader, Khaleda Zia, has languished in jail since February, on charges of misdirecting funds meant for an orphanage. During December, BNP officials say, no fewer than 10,000 party supporters were rounded up and imprisoned, including 17 candidates in the election. Another 18 candidates were disqualified on varied grounds—including in Ms Zia’s home seat, a party stronghold—and some 51 others were assaulted during the election campaign.
The sweeping nature of the repression meant that on voting day, few of the BNP’s electoral agents—who guide voters and monitor the process—dared show up at the 40,000 polling stations. By contrast, the Awami League fielded 120,000 agents. In Dhaka, the capital, it was hard to find a single poster for the BNP among the tens of thousands boosting the Awami League. In constituencies expected to lean to the ruling party lines were short and voting easy. In others, voters complained of having to wait for hours, of voting stations closing for lunch, and of reaching ballot boxes only to be told the ballots had run out. “Its like Microsoft 360: they’ve got it all covered,” remarked a BNP follower wryly.
The question that puzzles many in Bangladesh is, why? Why should Sheikh Hasina pull out so many stops to ensure a victory that most observers had assumed was in the bag in any case? Opinion polls had universally shown a solid advantage for the Awami League. Its decade in power has seen incomes triple, exports soar, and every measure of human development leap ahead. Heavy-handed policing and fierce repression of the Awami League’s political adversaries has little effect on ordinary Bangladeshis, who are happy that the spectre of Islamist terrorism has lifted, and proud that their country is hosting some 700,000 Rohingya refugees from neighbouring Myanmar.
Sheikh Hasina seems to bear a personal grudge against perceived enemies, which springs both from the murder of her father and other relatives in 1975 (he had led the independence movement and served as Bangladesh’s first prime minister) and from an attempt on her own life that has been tied to figures in the BNP. Some of the ruling party’s rivals suggest that it needs to cling to power to cover its own corruption. The more sympathetic say that the BNP was in fact just as high-handed and perhaps more corrupt while in power, and allied to radical Islamists to boot.
The question now is whether the Awami League’s landslide will bring relief, in the form of a government confident enough to ease up, or increased repression. A recent tweet from Sheikh Hasina’s influential son, Sajeed Wajed, is not reassuring in this regard: “Western media has called every eastern leader who developed his country rapidly authoritarian. Leaders like #Mahatir of #Malaysia, #LeeKwanYu of #Singapore. Can’t find any other fault, sling authoritarian mud!”