Judicial independence, media freedom and Sheikh Hasina

This is a story about a recorded conversation that says a lot about judicial independence and media freedom in Bangladesh - or the lack thereof.

Bangladesh's justice system is based upon an important fiction. It is a fiction not  uncommon to many authoritarian governments. This is the idea that the country's courts operate independently from the executive.

Probably, few people in Bangladesh actually believe that fiction. Many are aware of the partisan way in which magistrates and judges are appointed; how the government moves magistrates around from one court to another court, one district to another one, as and when they require; or indeed the powers of persuasion and intimidation held by the executive which they use to ensure that magistrates and judges make the "right" decision. Of course, if they have already appointed highly partisan judges, then little persuasion and intimidation will be necessary.

This is not to say that every decision goes the Bangladesh government's way. In a non-totalitarian country, there remains some levels of autonomy and independence, and certain conduct and decisions is outside the government's control.*

Nonetheless, this fiction of judicial independence is constantly claimed by government ministers and of course by the courts themselves. It is an important fiction; at some level the judicial system cannot function unless people have some kind of belief in the judiciary's independence.

In the past, the media - or more accurately the small parts of the media which remained independent  - did sometimes prick holes in this judicial fiction. However, it is rare - as doing so risked prosecution for contempt of court. Now, with even less media freedom in Bangladesh, it is a brave or reckless editor that would publish such a story.

It is in any case difficult for journalists at the best of time to get solid evidence that a particular judicial decision was made as a result of executive interference.

Occasionally, however, comments from the mouths of ministers themselves give the game away. And one such moment came a few days ago in a telephone conversation between the prime minister Sheikh Hasina and her UK Awami League party leaders in which she refers to the question of whether  Khaleda Zia, the leader of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, currently in jail following conviction for corruption, will be allowed out of jail or not. The government of course have said that it is upto the courts - and the courts are not giving her bail pending appeal.

Yet, a recording of a conversation between Sheikh Hasina and Awami League activists suggest that it is not the courts that will determine what happens to the opposition leader. 

The prime minister arrived in London last Wednesday, on 1 May. As is customary, Awami League leaders and activists came to the airport hoping to meet her. Amongst those present were Sultan Shariff, UK Awami League president and Syed Faruq, the UK Awami League secretary.

The video shows Syed Faruq holding a mobile phone, with the speaker phone on, and the voice of Sheikh Hasina can be heard. It appears that Hasina was using a mobile phone belonging to Bangladesh's High Commissioner to the UK, as the name of Sayeda Muna Tasneem is shown on Faruq's mobile phone screen.

The person who filmed the conversation was Md Akkadus, an Awami League activist using Facebook live. The video is no longer posted on his Facebook time line.

Sheikh Hasina's voice can be heard loud and clear. At first she says this:

I will talk with you later after the surgery in my eyes. Please don’t crowd the hotel. Because you make such a crowd, no hotel wants to give us booking now. I will talk to you later at my convenience.

She then goes onto to talk about Tareque Zia, the son of the opposition leader Khaleda Zia

And, let the BNP know that if Tarique shows his arrogance with me, his mother (Khaleda Zia) will never be able to come out of jail in her lifetime. He must understand that nothing can be realized from Sheikh Hasina by force. Their (BNP) MPs have joined parliament today. They had some demands… treatment and others (of Khaleda Zia). We are ready to consider [that demand]. Many have met me in this regard, but as I come here now, if Tarique shows his arrogance over it, then I will tell them: ‘Sorry, your leader (Tarique) has misbehaved with me, has done such malicious act, I will not…" (emphasis added)**

Sultan Shariff, the UK Awami League president told this blog that "It was a simple conversation. She wanted to say thank-you for coming as she had not come to the UK for a long time."

However, it is pretty blatant that this was not a "simple" conversation - and that it suggests that the decision about Khaleda Zia's bail will be dependent on Sheikh Hasina and not on any independent judicial decision.

Equally noteworthy is that not a single media outlet in Bangladesh (as far as this blog can make out) actually reported on this conversation although this video was widely distributed. This is a reflection of the highly restricted media operating in Bangladesh these days - as noone would dare report on this conversation.

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* In addition, there are many decisions before the courts that the government does not care that that much about anyway. And, of course, there are some individuals/organisations outside the government which can themselves corrupt the system so that the courts rule their, rather than the government's, way.

** This translation was revised on Thursday 9 May.

The '$300 million plot?' - lies, damn lies and Bangladesh political parties

In Bangladesh politics, there is minimal - if any - respect for basic facts.

This is particularly evident by the way in which politicians and the media have written and talked about the United States case involving the conviction and sentencing of three men involved in a bribery plot to obtain confidential information from the FBI.

To see the basis key facts relating to this case see here.

The Awami League's difficulty with the truth

On the Awami League side, we first had the basic misrepresentations made by Sajeeb Wazed, the son of the Bangladesh prime minister in his various Facebook posts. 

Second, we have the way in which pro-Awami Leaguers - and the media - have written about the case. 

Thirdly, most recently we have the prime minister herself. The Bangladesh Observer, reported the following:

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on Saturday vowed to bring to justice those who conspired both at home and abroad to abduct and kill her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy in the USA.

"The conspiracy has been proved in the USA court," she told a civic rally arranged at Kotalipara Sheikh Lutfar Rahman Ideal Government College ground in the afternoon.

Referring to a USA court judgement, Hasina said an FBI official and a BNP leader have been sentenced to jail for their involvement in hatching a plot to abduct and kill Joy, also the PM’s ICT Affairs Adviser.

Assuming this to be an accurate news report, what the prime minister said was completely inaccurate; any claim that the US court had held or had ruled that there was a conspiracy to abduct and kill Joy is simply untrue.

The court convicted and sentenced the three men on bribery charges and there was never any charges relating to attempting to kidnap/hurt/kill any person. It is correct that the FBI had some evidence that Rizvi sought to kidnap and hurt Wazed, but the court, in the course of sentencing, ruled that it did not believe the evidence and dismissed it. It is also the case that the FBI did not present in the court any evidence that Shafiq Rahman or any other person was involved in any plan of Ahmed's to hurt Wazed.

If the prime minister wanted to use the US case to justify its investigation into the so-called 'plot to kill Joy', this is what she should have said - if at least she wanted to be accurate about the US case.

'A man in the United States pleaded guilty to bribing an FBI agent to obtain financial and other information about my son Sajeeb. During the investigation, the FBI found evidence that suggested that one of the reasons this man sought the information was to kidnap and harm him. The man was never prosecuted for this offence. Moreover the Judge during sentencing ruled that he did not believe that particular evidence. However, there was some evidence, and the Bangladesh government wants to look into this matter to see if there is any further evidence to support the claim that Ahmed planned to hurt my son, and see whether other people were involved.' 

However, it is my calculation that the reason why the Awami League leaders have to misrepresent and misconstrue the US case so much is because they have no further evidence to support its claim of a plot to kill the prime minister's son

The BNP's difficulty with the truth.
But of course it is not just the Awami League. The BNP have now got into the act.

On Sunday, May day, Khaleda Zia , the leader of the BNP, is reported to have said:

“The [US] case files say there is $300 million, which is equal to Tk 25 billion, in an account of the prime minister’s son. 

Where did this money come from? What is the source of this money? ... 

The court had its suspicion over $300 million or Tk 25 billion in his (Joy’s) account. The FBI found the money in investigation.

If you do not release [Shafik Rehman and Mahmudur Rahman], if you are the true prime minister of the people, then your son Joy needs o be questioned in custody about where he got this $300 million or Tk 25 billion.”

“Is this money legal?” 

Well, the case files do not state that there is '$300 million' in the 'account of the prime minister's son'.

The case records only say that there was an FBI memorandum relating to Sajeeb Wazed in which the words '$300 million' were written. It does not say anything more than that. Whilst it is possible that Khaleda is right that the document states that this money is in Wazed's account, it is much more likely not to be the case.

The reason for this is that  had Wazed's accounts really contained this amount of money, the US authorities would surely have taken action against him. Moreover, if is was written in the FBI memorandum that Wazed has this money in the bank, Shafik Rehman would immediately have published it - since this clearly would be sensational news.

The seven questions the Netherlands PM should ask Sheikh Hasina

The Bangladesh prime minister arriving in the
Netherlands on a three day trip

Netherlands has become the first European (or indeed 'Western' country) to invite the Bangladesh prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, on an official visit since the controversial 5 January 2014 elections.

Bangladesh, as a country, has much going for it with an economy motoring along at 6%, and a government with big dreams of moving the country to a middle income country.

At the same time, however, the human rights situation has perhaps never been worse - certainly not since the return of democracy  in 1990. As Human Rights Watch has recently put it: the country has a ‘large number of chronic and serious human rights violations which fly under the radar on the global scene.’

So, whilst the Netherlands ministers discusses important things as cooperation on dealing with flooding in Bangladesh, and other development collaborations, perhaps they can also take the time to at least ask her questions on these seven issues

1. Media Freedom

The country's military intelligence DGFI, which the prime minister controls, has ordered the major telecommunications and consumer companies to stop advertising by in the country's two leading independent newspapers, The Daily Star and Prothom Alo.

What are you going to do to stop this significant infringement of the freedom of the media and intimidation of these papers?

• Bangladesh spies accused of blocking media adverts 
• Bangladesh blocks ads, curbs media freedom
• 7 things you need to know about the government advert embargo

Seven 'take-aways' from The Leaked Phone Call

Here are seven initial take-aways from the leaked conversation between Bangladesh's prime minister and the opposition leader that took place on Saturday 26 October.

Two different versions of the transcripts of the conversations are available on line: that of The Dhaka Tribune and that of the Daily Ittefaq. The original taped conversation (in Bangla) is here

1. The government recorded the conversation and leaked it

A day before the conversation was broadcast on Ekkatorer TV, the information minster stated that the government should publish the contents of the conversation between the two woman. One can be pretty confident that the conversation was therefore recorded by the government and then leaked by its officials. That it was leaked to Ekkatorer (rather than any other broadcaster) also fits into this picture - since it is a reliable pro-governemnt broadcaster.

2. Publication will have negative repercussions for future dialogue

Perhaps the BNP expected the conversation to be recorded and leaked (and perhaps the BNP were even recording the conversation themselves), however, it is more than likely that the Khaleda Zia did not expect that the conversation would be published without her consent. This inevitably increases the levels of mistrust between the two woman - and the two parties - which are already pretty much at rock bottom.

Can the BNP ever assume that any future conversations - between the two woman, or at a lower level in the party - will not be recorded and put in the public domain? How can negotiations take place when one of the parties thinks that the other one may be recording the conversation and possibly considering publishing if they believe they can get political benefit.

In such a situation, it is difficult to see how future negotiations between these two parties can take place

3. Hasina's invitation, Khaleda's rebuke

The invitation by Hasina came quite soon into the conversation - before a lot of the more antagonistic dialogue between the two women. At this early stage, Zia refused to meet Hasina before the Hartal had finished, or to consider calling it off. Subsequently Zia says that she cannot call it off as she would have to consult with all the other members of the alliance, and that had Hasina called on Friday, then it may have been possible.

As I have written elsewhere, this rejection was a strategic mistake by Khaleda The transcript also shows that the reasons for her not accepting the invitation are really not justifiable. Khaleda said in her speech that she would hold a hartal unless the prime minister initiated dialogue - and this is what Hasina is doing though this conversation. It was clearly not too late to call of the hartal, or at the very least agree to meet each other with the hartal ongoing.

4. It was Hasina who first starts making the accusations

There is much accusation and counter accusation in this conversation, but it is worth noting that it was Hasina who started to raise the allegations first, when she said near the beginning of the conversation: 'Killing people, throwing fires... stop these.'

It was also Hasina who brought up the August 21 grenade attack. 'I remember everything, I remember the August 21 grenade attack...'

And later again she said, 'Will you keep killing people in the name of hartal?'

And she is the also one who brings up the issue of Khaleda's decision to hold her birthday on 15 August - the day the prime minister's family was assassinated.

These are of course justifiable resentments that Hasina can hold against the BNP, but they are obviously completely irrelevant in terms of seeking to initiate a dialogue and, whether intentionally or not, increase the likelihood of derailing any possible dialogue

5. The burden of history

Those who know Bangladesh politics know how much the burden of the past lies heavily on the shoulders of the present - and this conversation is a reflection of this.

1971, post 1971, Ershad, 1991, 2004 - it was all there scattered around the conversation preventing the possibility of any clear thinking about the future.

This is of course the reason why there do remain many who believe that it is the two women - and the history that they together bring - which is such a key problem for the politics of Bangladesh which will not flourish until a new breed of politicians, unconnected to these families, finally takes over. There however seems no signs of that - as both women's sons remain ever-present in the background.

6. The victor?

The Awami League government must have thought that Hasina came out of the conversation better than Khaleda - otherwise it would not have allowed it to published.

This is also seem by Hasina's son Sajeeb Wazed statement in a note on face book  that Khaleda emerged as 'rude and combative'. And the prime minister herself appears to feel much the same.

Unsurprisingly, of course, the BNP are stating that it was Zia's combative style that made her the victor, and the word on the street is that BNP activists are quite chuffed by their leader's role.

Whether people think BNP/AL won or not, very much depends on what they think of Khaleda's dominant/agreessive role in the conversation, and their view on whether they consider Hasina was inappropriately provoking Khaleda.

Whilst in many other countries, Khaleda's style may be perceived negatively as bullying, this may not be the way it is seen here in Bangladesh.

7. .... And of course, the dead parrot

There is a famous monty python sketch (a 1960's British comedy group) when a man comes into a pet shop and accuses the shopkeeper of selling him a dead parrot. 

At the beginning of the phone conversation between the two women and then again midway through it there are long sections in which the women just consider whether or not Khaleda's red phone was dead or not. 

If nothing else, this conversation will make fantastic material for a Bangladeshi comedian. The dead phone sketch!Here are two extracts about the 'dead phone'

Hasina: I called you around noon, but unfortunately you didn’t pick up. I want to invite you.
Khaleda: This is not correct. You have to listen to what I have to say. You say you called in the afternoon, but I received no call. The hotline has been inactive for years now.
Hasina: But I called to the red phone personally.
Khaleda: The red phone has been dead for a long a time. You run the government, and you don’t even know the Opposition Leader’s phone is dead.
Hasina: Red phone is never out of order.
Khaleda Zia: Send your people over right now, and let them check.
Hasina: You know that red phone always works.
Khaleda: It always works, but mine is not working at all. I checked it just recently. If you don’t tell the truth, it will not work.
Hasina: There’s nothing I can do if you lie. I know I have called several times.
Khaleda: Can a dead person come alive? How can a dead phone come to life all of a sudden?
Hasina: Ok, so for some reason you weren’t able to receive the phone.
Khaleda: No, that is not true. I have been sitting here. It is a small space. I cannot miss a phone call. There is no reason not to answer if a phone call comes.
Hasina: The phone was either dead or kept dead…
Khaleda: It was dead. Several complaints were made. There is no one I can talk with through the red phone. Thus, who will I talk with?
Hasina: I will look into why your phone was dead tomorrow.
Khaleda: It is good that you will see to it. .......

Hasina: Your phone is all right.
Khaleda: My phone is not okay.
Hasina: I called up 10-12 times. The phone rang.
Khaleda: Do you think we were all deaf? That the phone rang and we did not hear? You might hear it.
Hasina: How will I hear? One of my ear is damaged.
Khaleda: It is you who have said that my phone had rang, but we are saying that it didn’t.
Hasina: Phone…… Phone, I made the call myself.
Khaleda: It does not matter if you say you have called. You are saying that a dead phone has rung.
Hasina: The phone rang.
Khaleda: How will it ring? A dead phone does not ring. This is a display of your mentality, and it shows if you are telling the truth or not.
Hasina: I am telling the truth.
Khaleda: I checked the phone yesterday [Saturday]. We told your people that the phone was dead, but no one came. Nobody thinks of us as human, nobody feels it important to fix our telephone.
Hasina: Why are you blaming the telephone and telling a lie?
Khaleda: [snaps] Why will I tell lies? A dead telephone is dead.
Hasina: …21602, I remember.
Khaleda: You might have the number memorised, or written down somewhere nearby, but the fact is that the telephone is dead. Nobody will believe anything else otherwise.
Hasina: A cameraman once came…This is nothing. The telephone exchange can be contacted to know what had really happened…
Khaleda: Who of Gulshan Exchange said that the phone was ringing? Actions should be taken against that person.
Hasina: The red telephone of yours belongs to a separate exchange.
Khaleda: That is true…Why is it being said that the phone was okay…Did the person you spoke to tell you as such? I was sitting here waiting for the phone call. We talked over the phone many times, during anti-Ershad campaigns that we waged together. Why will we not talk? We talked so many times, went to your home, why not talk now? Come let us sit together for talks for the sake of the country.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party's strategic advantage at risk

David Bergman

It may seen ridiculous to suggest that either of Bangladesh’s main political parties could these days ever be seated on any moral high ground, but in relation to the argument concerning the election time government, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party was on it, and now – arguably - isn’t.

The political situation in Bangladesh is fast changing and so months down the line, when everything comes out in the wash, the decision on Saturday by Khaleda Zia to reject the invitation by the prime-minister for dinner at her official residence, and to continue with the hartal, may of course not seem that relevant.

At the large rally on Friday, Khaleda Zia announced that there would be a three day hartal from Sunday onwards unless the prime-minister initiated dialogue to solve the political stalemate around the nature of the election time government.

This seemed a clever move - suggesting that the BNP wanted to find a solution through diplomacy. There was the stick of the hartal, for sure, but one which could easily be averted by a phone call from the Prime Minister.

BNP was on the moral high ground.

And so on Saturday, the prime-minister decided to do what apparently Zia had wanted her to do - phone her up and start the process of dialogue by inviting the opposition leader to a dinner at her official residence on Monday.

You might expect that the BNP would see this as a victory – their demand had forced the prime minister to make a phone call. This might not seem much, but this must be just about the first demand made by the BNP in the last five years which the government has actually accepted, and immediately at that.

However, Bangladesh politicians have reversed clausevitz’s famous aphorism; for them, or for many of them, politics in this country is the continuation of war by other means.

The BNP could not simply just accept the prime minister’s offer - they had to give her and the Awami League a bloody nose first.

For them, this ultimately was what the three day hartal was all about; trying to show the Awami League that the ruling party no longer had control of ‘the streets’ and could not necessarily depend on the law enforcement agencies.

Attacks on Awami Leaguers and their supporters are an intrinsic part of this hartal – to send a message to the ruling party that their time is up; that the opposition is organizationally strong, and can muster people to take on the government if the time was necessary.

And only when this message has been given, would the BNP then sit down for a dialogue – as only then, so their logic went, might the government actually take its demands seriously.

So when faced with the offer of dinner what did Zia do? She refused the dinner until the 60 hour hartal had finished.

Now, the country is back to square one - there has to be another phone call, another offer, and quite reasonably the Awami League prime minister may well question why she should go through another phone call when the opposition leader has failed to keep the terms of her previous public commitment.

Losing the moral high ground is one thing, but how will this affect the BNP’s strategic advantage

For that is what the BNP has at the moment.

The polls universally show that the BNP’s demand for a caretaker government is popular throughout the country even amongst AL supporters, and these same polls also show, with the BNP ten percentage points ahead of the AL, that the opposition party has the most to gain from free and fair elections and the ruling party most to lose.

In addition Western diplomats – as well as apparently those from China - stand much closer to the BNP’s position which is that there should be a neutral interim government, than the position of the AL which is that elections should take place under a party government.

These diplomats also accept that the BNP is right to question whether free and fair elections can take place without, at the very least Hasina standing down from the head of any election-time government – and so for them, it is Hasina who has to move towards the BNP position.

What this all means that is that - unless of course the Awami League comes out with a reasonable offer which the main opposition party rejects - these countries are highly unlikely to send election observers to any election in which the BNP does not participate, and will not recognize the result of any Awami League victory.

So, the BNP has the support of the majority of Bangladeshis as well as that of the international community in seeking concessions from the Awami League government. It is on the right side of this particular argument, and assuming that it is actually willing to negotiate with the ruling party, it will either win the concessions or, if it doesn’t, it will win the support of the international community if the AL tries to conduct the election alone.

This is a strong position to be in. Clearly there remain uncertainties - the role of India, for example, as a counter to the western countries. But nonetheless, the  BNP is well placed.

But this can so easily be lost.

Violence, strategically instigated by the opposition, will result in it losing support from the international community who will increasingly listen to the siren voices of the Awami League that are tirelessly telling diplomats that the BNP/Jamaat are a dangerous political alternative.

Whilst arguments about the nature of the next BNP government are of course separate from those about an election time government, they will inevitably impact upon how willing the diplomatic community would be in the future to question the legitimacy of elections under an Awami League government in which the BNP does not participate.

In addition, hartals and violence will not help the BNP sustain its popularity in the country.

Hartals are very unpopular; in a January 2013 Nielsen/Democracy International poll, over 90 percent of people viewed them as ‘bad.’ And violence perpetrated by the BNP/Jamaat will only tend to feed into the Awami League’s rhetoric of what people have to fear from the opposition winning the election.

Of course in the Bangladesh political activist’s mindset – where politics is just another form of war – there is a belief that people will only support the party if it is seen as a victor. They do not subscribe to the view that violence will necessary make them unpopular - giving the govt a bit a beating in their eyes only adds to their popularity.

If the BNP do allow themselves to be seduced by these arguments, they will however see their strategic advantage soon disappearing.

And that is not good for those who want to see a free and fair elections under some kind of government acceptable to both parties.

The BNP should put all their effort into dialogue and forcing, through legitimate political action, a change in the AL’s position on the election time government.

Hartals and political violence are a dead end – and only add to the risk of the possibility of the army stepping in.

And if that were to happen all bets are off as to which party will come out better the other end.